What arguments motivate citizens to demand nuclear disarmament by Harrington, Anne et al.
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/118145/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Harrington, Anne, Gheorghe, Eliza and Loukianova, Anya 2017. What arguments motivate citizens
to demand nuclear disarmament. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73 (4) , pp. 255-263.
10.1080/00963402.2017.1338039 Item availability restricted. file 
Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402...
<http://dx.doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.1338039>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rbul20
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
ISSN: 0096-3402 (Print) 1938-3282 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbul20
What arguments motivate citizens to demand
nuclear disarmament?
Anne I. Harrington, Eliza Gheorghe & Anya Loukianova Fink
To cite this article: Anne I. Harrington, Eliza Gheorghe & Anya Loukianova Fink (2017) What
arguments motivate citizens to demand nuclear disarmament?, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
73:4, 255-263, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2017.1338039
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.1338039
Published online: 19 Jun 2017.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 449
View Crossmark data
What arguments motivate citizens to demand nuclear disarmament?
Anne I. Harrington, Eliza Gheorghe and Anya Loukianova Fink
ABSTRACT
Why is the global public so apathetic about nuclear disarmament? To answer this question, this
article examines the various arguments made in support of policies meant to rid the world of
atomic weapons. They include the immorality of deterrence, its impracticality in a world where
the enemy does not behave rationally, and the calamitous consequences of nuclear accidents.
The authors argue that the approach with the highest chance of successfully stimulating political
activism focuses on the current costs of maintaining nuclear arsenals.
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In many countries around the world, including those
that have nuclear weapons, a majority of citizens sup-
port the goal of nuclear disarmament. This should be
good news for organizations like the Nuclear Security
Project, Global Zero, and the International Campaign
to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, which want to stimulate
and engage civil society in an effort to reduce global
nuclear dangers. Many of these groups have the funds
and sophistication to conduct robust outreach, by, for
example, engaging students on university campuses,
building civil society coalitions, or producing full-
length documentaries.
Yet despite the disarmament organizations’ best
efforts, and despite people’s stated support, at least in
principle, for nuclear abolition, only a small minority
actively engages in initiatives that contribute to the
goal. Why? In part, this lack of civil society engagement
could be due to a perception that the era of the nuclear
arms race is over. Another reason might be that in a
number of nuclear weapon states, criticism of national
security policies can be dangerous. Still, the gap
between support for the goal of nuclear disarmament
and the lack of public engagement is puzzling.
One way to provide insight into this puzzle is to
break apart the various arguments in favor of nuclear
disarmament and evaluate them each for potential
effectiveness in motivating grassroots participation.
Too often, disarmament groups are painted with a
broad brush, but their visions and goals are actually
quite distinct. They make at least six separate argu-
ments about the desirability of disarmament, each
with its own strengths and weaknesses. Specifically,
they argue that we should get rid of nuclear weapons
because: terrorists can get their hands on a nuclear
device; not all adversaries are rational; the very exis-
tence of nuclear weapons poses a danger to us all;
nuclear weapons are inherently immoral and abhor-
rent; they are accident-prone; and they cost an unaf-
fordable amount.
While sometimes subsets of these arguments can
reinforce one another, that is not always the case.
Arguments grounded primarily in the fear of nuclear
attack are only effective at motivating grassroots
engagement when people feel like those threats are
imminent. These fear-based arguments may also have
the inadvertent effect of strengthening security-based
arguments for maintaining nuclear deterrence, with
citizens reasoning that their own government needs
atomic weapons to make sure another government
does not attack. On the other hand, arguments that
focus on the current environmental, human, and finan-
cial costs of maintaining nuclear arsenals could be
more likely to sustain meaningful public engagement
and generate political activism.
Lackluster public engagement
Over the last decade, there have been numerous polls
focused on understanding societal attitudes toward
nuclear weapons. These polls have detailed public opi-
nion on the use of nuclear weapons, their moderniza-
tion, agreements to reduce their numbers, and their
possible elimination. Arguably, in both nuclear and
nonnuclear states, a majority of citizens view nuclear
weapons negatively, and therefore could support the
goal of nuclear disarmament in principle (Rethink
Media 2009-2016; World Public Opinion 2008).
However, only a small minority takes part in initiatives
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that raise awareness about the dangers of nuclear weap-
ons or contribute to the goal of abolition (Wittner
2010a).
This lack of civil society engagement could be due to
the perception that the most dangerous era for nuclear
weapons – the Cold War – is over, and that today’s
nuclear policies are not a matter of great concern or
urgency. International enthusiasm spawned by former
US president Barack Obama’s 2009 call for a world free
of nuclear weapons appears to have waned. And, as the
United States and Russia, along with other nuclear-
armed states, embark on nuclear weapon moderniza-
tion programs, windows of opportunity to promote
nuclear disarmament appear to have closed.
The lack of broad disarmament activism could also
be due to the fact that the public is uninformed about
the basic facts with regard to nuclear weapons, let alone
their role in today’s security environment (Rethink
Media 2009-2016). The public could also believe that
there are defenses against a potential nuclear attack
(Moore 2001). In some cases, public opinion may
reflect the fact that a country relies on another’s
“nuclear umbrella,” benefiting from the protection
offered by a nuclear patron in case of an attack
(International Business Times 2015). And, in many
“nuclear newcomer” countries, the development and
demonstration of nuclear technologies, peaceful and
otherwise, is linked to a sense of national achievement
and pride (PIPA 2015).
Because disarmament activism in nuclear-armed
states implies a public objection to the policies of a
standing government, this type of activism takes cour-
age. During the Cold War, activism and peace advo-
cacy by nuclear scientists in the Soviet Union and the
United States was viewed with great suspicion. In the
Soviet Union, dissidents like the creator of the Soviet
hydrogen bomb, Andrei Sakharov, were persecuted and
lived in internal exile for decades. Even in the United
States, nuclear scientists were caught up in public hear-
ings about their potential Communist sympathies. In
addition, antinuclear weapons activism may be danger-
ous in states that have deliberately sought to disem-
power nongovernmental organizations. In these states,
civil society groups rarely go against the government
line, as they risk persecution and harassment or even
being shut down.
There is also competition for activist energies. In
many Western democracies, there is an ongoing public
backlash to the trends of globalization, automation,
and social change that, some feel, threaten their way
of life. More disturbing is the heightened sense of
internal insecurity that has mobilized public sentiment
and action against “the other,” that is, immigrants and
minorities. In comparison, the dangers associated with
nuclear weapons may seem less pressing. Moreover,
public polling suggests that when the public perceives
a growth in external or internal security threats – even
threats, like terrorism, that cannot be countered with
nuclear weapons – they are much less likely to support
nuclear weapons reductions (Grice 2016; Sagan and
Valentino 2016).
Even in places where the public is aware of the
dangers of nuclear weapons, they may not perceive
them as an immediate policy priority on par with the
economy or internal security. They may also distrust
scientists. To this end, there may be overlaps between
the challenges faced by climate change scientists in
motivating public action and those faced by nuclear
experts in catalyzing action on disarmament (CRED
2009).
Finally, disarmament is only likely to seem like a
high priority, on par with shelter and safety, to those
whose well-being is personally and immediately
affected by nuclear technology. There are numerous
examples of such people, including the survivors of
the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
(the Hibakusha) and individuals impacted by nuclear
testing (such as the Downwinders in the United States).
A terrible nuclear accident can also make nuclear dan-
gers in general a higher priority in people’s minds. For
example, concerns stemming from the human and
environmental consequences of the 1986 Chernobyl
nuclear power plant accident had an impact on the
Soviet leadership’s views on nuclear weapons
(Gorbachev 1986).
It may also be that today’s nuclear disarmament
movement has simply not yet had a chance to apply
the kind of focus, persistence, and time that moti-
vated nuclear activism during the Cold War era. The
call to halt the nuclear arms race initiated in the
1970s grew into the full-fledged Nuclear Freeze
Movement in the United States only as a result of
diligent grassroots organizing; endorsement of its
platform by a coalition that included major religious
denominations, academic associations, women’s orga-
nizations, and doctors’ groups; and the passage of
related resolutions by numerous city councils and
state legislatures (Wittner 2010b). At its height, the
Freeze was able to offer a vocal and organized coun-
terpoint to the nuclear rhetoric of the Reagan
Administration, and even become a plank of the
Democratic Party platform in 1984. Achieving a
desired policy outcome is usually the product of
sustained coordination that includes not only civil
society, but also draws in policy makers, funders,
and other stakeholders (ORS Impact 2015).
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All that said, public engagement remains a very
important driver of policy change in nuclear disarma-
ment as in anything else. Understanding the different
arguments and how they motivate the public can only
help advance the cause.
Why is nuclear disarmament desirable?
Too often, arguments about the desirability of nuclear
disarmament, and the groups that champion those argu-
ments, are treated monolithically, making them easier for
opponents to dismiss. By disaggregating the different
arguments, it becomes possible to assess their relative
strengths and weaknesses. At the same time, separating
the arguments from one another brings into relief ten-
sions within the disarmament movement. In particular,
there is a schism between those who would eliminate
nuclear weapons but seek to maintain the existing balance
of power, and those who believe nuclear disarmament
should liberate states from the inequities of the current
structure of nuclear “haves” and nuclear “have nots.”
In the following paragraphs, we identify six argu-
ments for why nuclear weapon states ought to disarm,
and subsequently we consider how these different argu-
ments are taken up by advocacy groups.
Argument 1: terrorists have “no return address”
The post-9/11 shift in American security culture from a
paradigm in which traditional nation-state adversaries
reigned supreme to one in which non-state actors
became a major justification for the use of military
force had a profound impact on nuclear politics. The
possibility of a nuclear terrorist act provided a new
rationale for eliminating nuclear weapons, because
nuclear terrorism did not fit within the conceptual fra-
mework of nuclear deterrence. By definition, non-state
terrorist groups have no sovereign territory; they have
no “return address” (Shultz et al. 2007). Therefore,
deterrence using a threat of retaliation in kind is not a
viable option. In fact, in the current political climate, no
one considers the large-scale destruction of another
states’ sovereign territory a credible option, even if that
state is harboring terrorists. (Instead, retaliation takes
the form of targeting terrorists for kill or capture.)
The weakness of the no-return-address argument is
that it overestimates and exaggerates the security threat
terrorism poses. The risk of being killed in a terrorist
attack is about 1 in 3.5 million, which is much lower
than dying from an accident involving a home appli-
ance (1 in 1.5 million) or a bathtub (1 in 950,000)
(Mueller and Stewart 2010).
Argument 2: not all adversaries are rational
Critics of deterrence theory have long argued that not
all actors can reliably be deterred, because their beha-
vior cannot be assumed to be rational (Morgan 1977).
Deterrence relies on the assumption that the actors in
question are rational and will seek to preserve their
own survival. New nuclear states, in particular, have
been viewed with suspicion. From Iraq to North Korea
to Iran, states that have flouted international norms
and laws with clandestine nuclear programs have
engendered debate about whether or not their leaders
could be counted on to make rational decisions.
The weakness of this argument is that by emphasiz-
ing the threat posed by nonrational states, it could end
up strengthening the case of those who argue that it is
best to negotiate with these nuclear newcomer coun-
tries from a position of force. Nuclear weapons offer
the ultimate embodiment of such force, which is why
this argument may play well in the hands of anti-
disarmament advocates.
Argument 3: eliminating nuclear weapons reduces
the likelihood of nuclear war
The third argument is one that focuses on the dangers
posed by nuclear war. In contrast to the arguments
focusing on nuclear terrorism or irrational actors –
which posit that rogue states and terrorist groups are
the primary threats to national security – the central
claim of this argument is that nuclear weapons them-
selves are the primary threat to human security. The
advocates of this perspective reject the central premise
of nuclear deterrence, namely that preparing to fight a
nuclear war is the best way to prevent one. Instead, they
see the production of nuclear weapons as generating a
risk to global security that would not otherwise exist.
Their preferred solution to the nuclear dilemma, there-
fore, is to rid the world of nuclear danger by eliminating
nuclear weapons. However, by hyping the danger of
nuclear weapons, this approach can inadvertently feed
the perceived need for a strong nuclear deterrent.
Deterrence advocates fetishize the dangers of nuclear
war in a similar way, but feel that maintaining a nuclear
arsenal is the best way to prevent nuclear weapons from
being used (Harrington de Santana 2009).
Argument 4: nuclear weapons are immoral and
illegitimate
The next argument involves delegitimizing nuclear
weapons. Like those who argue that nuclear weapons
are inherently dangerous, those who call them immoral
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say that nuclear weapons are threatening regardless of
who possesses them. However, the delegitimizing line
of persuasion is unique in that it makes a moral argu-
ment. Proponents argue that possessing or using
nuclear weapons violates basic principles of human
rights. By focusing on human rights, advocates of dele-
gitimizing nuclear weapons widen the discussion to
include the human suffering that has occurred as a
result of nuclear explosions, and will occur in the
event of a nuclear war (Ritchie 2014; Sauer and
Pretorius 2014).
However, the desire to prevent the horrors of a
nuclear-armed conflict is also a keystone for supporters
of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence is a strategy to
dissuade military aggression through the threat of retalia-
tion in kind. There is no disagreement, per se, among
supporters of nuclear deterrence and supporters of dele-
gitimizing nuclear weapons on whether or not using
them would be inhumane. Rather, they disagree on the
best method of preventing that outcome. Both groups
depend on invoking a future imaginary loss – of indivi-
duals, states, or the human race. What for some may lead
to the conclusion that ridding the world of nuclear weap-
ons is the only way to prevent that loss may for others
reinvigorate a commitment to deterrence.
Argument 5: accidents will happen
The fifth argument highlights the risk of accidents
involving nuclear weapons. Accidents, by the usual
definition, are abnormal occurrences, unintended
aberrations from a normal protocol or routine.
However, in tightly coupled, complex systems, like
nuclear arsenals, accidents are inevitable. In fact, the
more redundancies that are introduced to try to pre-
vent accidents, the more opportunities arise for
something to go wrong. Accidents are, therefore, to
be expected in any complex system (Perrow 1999).
The recent book Command and Control by Eric
Schlosser revived the discussion of nuclear weapons
as sophisticated machines embedded in complex sys-
tems that could be prone to catastrophic accidents
(Schlosser 2013). Proponents of the “accidents will
happen” argument seek to raise awareness within
academic and policy maker communities, as well as
among the wider public. It is an argument that
focuses attention on the importance of safety in
organizational culture, with the goal of making
changes to the way nuclear arsenals are structured
in order to minimize tight coupling and complex
interactions. If one’s goal is to reduce nuclear danger,
then eliminating nuclear weapons and the inevitable
accompanying accidents is one of the surest ways.
This approach, however, is not necessarily an effec-
tive disarmament argument since its primary focus is
not on elimination, but on making nuclear weapons
“safer” and also reducing their number in order to
minimize, among other things, the risk of accidental
wars, the threats to command and control emerging
from the cyber domain, and the dangers of
proliferation.
Argument 6: maintaining nuclear arsenals is costly
Most arguments about the desirability of nuclear dis-
armament are future oriented; they focus on the threat
of annihilation. The construction and maintenance of
nuclear programs, however, also comes with existing
human, environmental, financial, and political costs.
Many of these costs, especially environmental ones,
are poorly understood. In the United States and other
nuclear-armed states, the focus on future costs has
preempted or obscured discussion about the current
costs and other social trade-offs of nuclear weapons.
Focusing on the latter instead may be a promising
argument for public engagement.
Advocates and policy
Disarmament advocates use many of these argu-
ments simultaneously in different combinations.
For example, the International Campaign to
Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) invokes argu-
ments about humanitarian norms heavily, but also
frequently connects them to “current costs” or “acci-
dents” arguments. Yet there is not universal agree-
ment among advocacy groups about why nuclear
weapon states ought to disarm. For instance, the so-
called four horsemen – George Shultz, William
Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn – use the
nuclear terrorism argument, and also frequently
bring up accidents. But they mostly ignore the
humanitarian norms argument as it does not fit
with their realist worldview; this puts them at odds
with some other disarmament advocates. In this
section we discuss the arguments listed, connecting
them to organizations that have dedicated resources
to public engagement. We focus on three new orga-
nizations that emerged in the early 2000s: The four
horsemen's Nuclear Security Project; Global Zero;
and ICAN and the Humanitarian Initiative.
The Nuclear Security Project
Multiple organizations have taken up the nuclear
terrorism argument and added it to their list of
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reasons for disarmament. However, this argument
played a special role for the leadership of the
Nuclear Security Project, which was formed by the
“four horsemen,” all former US statesmen, in 2007.
In providing a new rationale for disarmament, it
allowed the old guard to hold on to its belief in the
effectiveness of Cold War-era nuclear deterrence,
while at the same time advocating for abolition on
a practical rather than moral basis. When Shultz and
his colleagues first came out in favor of “a world free
of nuclear weapons,” critics questioned their sincerity
and grumbled about the effect of old age on their
judgment. How, people wondered, could these archi-
tects of the Cold War have had such a change of
heart? Their answer was that they had not changed,
but the world around them had.
Unlike Cold War-era grassroots disarmament move-
ments and groups like Pugwash, the new abolitionists
do not take issue with the rationality and practice of
superpower nuclear deterrence – they argue that
nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining interna-
tional security during the Cold War. Now, they argue,
the actors have changed: Not only are small states like
North Korea now testing and refining their warhead
design, but the possibility of nuclear terrorism by non-
state groups looms large. These new abolitionists argue
that “non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons
are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent
strategy” (Shultz et al. 2007).
Unlike traditional advocates of disarmament, the
new abolitionists do not conceive of the goal of a
world free of nuclear weapons as the solution to pre-
venting nuclear war. They are primarily focused on
preventing nuclear attacks that fall short of full-scale
nuclear war, and believe that the risks of disarmament
are worth the benefits. They agree that working toward
the goal of complete nuclear disarmament, regardless
of how ill-defined it remains, is necessary to motivate
the cooperation required to secure loose nuclear mate-
rials and keep them out of the hands of terrorists. As
Shultz and company explained in their 2007 op-ed,
“Without the bold vision, the actions will not be per-
ceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision
will not be perceived as realistic or possible” (Shultz
et al. 2007). However, as they readily admit, they have
not yet reconciled the desire for a world free of nuclear
weapons with the fact that their vision sits uncomfor-
tably within the broader framework of their Cold War-
era worldview.
In sum, proponents of this argument envisage a
world free of nuclear weapons, with a short- and med-
ium-term focus on reducing threats of terrorism and
accidental use. Their actions are an effort by elites to
engage elites, primarily in nuclear states. The immedi-
ate focus is on reducing the dangers posed by nuclear
weapons, decreasing nuclear reliance, and improving
the security of nuclear weapons and materials.
However, it takes considerable time to bring about
the kind of policy change they aim for, and this lack
of immediacy may diminish the degree to which civil
society engages in the effort.
Global Zero
The focus on eliminating nuclear weapons was com-
mon among Cold War-era disarmament movements,
which began with the dissident nuclear physicists who
founded two organizations that are still in existence
today: the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and Pugwash.
The Bulletin is, of course, a policy-focused publication
that provides scientifically grounded, expert-level ana-
lysis, and Pugwash is a forum for dialog among inter-
national nuclear experts. Concerns about the peril to
future generations posed by atomic arsenals also lay at
the heart of numerous grassroots antinuclear protests
during the Cold War, including the demonstrations
organized by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
and the Women’s International League for Peace and
Freedom, as well as spontaneous movements that
sprang up through existing women’s networks –
enabled by chain letters and phone trees – like the
Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp in the
United Kingdom, which spread to the United States,
Italy, and Australia (Martin 2006).
In today’s environment, Global Zero is the highest
profile advocacy group that relies on this line of
thought to structure its rhetoric. Global Zero launched
in the wake of the 2007 call by Shultz, Perry, Kissinger,
and Nunn for a world free of nuclear weapons. While
the nuclear-danger argument advanced by Global Zero
has some overlap with other arguments, like other
organizations it is also distinguished by its own central
animus.
Global Zero gained a lot of its prominence and
energy after former US president Obama’s 2009 speech
in Prague, in which he announced “America’s commit-
ment to seek the peace and security of a world without
nuclear weapons” (The White House Office of the
Press Secretary 2009). The group solicited (and gar-
nered) support from world leaders, including Russia’s
then-President Dmitry Medvedev, allowing these lea-
ders to gain credit for endorsing disarmament as a
long-term goal without committing to any practical
steps. Global Zero endorses an action plan that begins
with bilateral US and Russian reductions and builds
toward a multilateral instrument, compliance with
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which would be supported by rigorous on-site inspec-
tions. Under their plan, all nuclear weapons would be
eliminated by 2030 (Global Zero Commission 2010).
However, with the worsening of US–Russian relations
and the continuation of nuclear modernization pro-
grams, including in the United States, enthusiasm for
these initiatives appears to have waned. Today, Global
Zero is primarily an effort to build millennial support
and grassroots validation for disarmament and risk
reduction. Without high-impact activism, nuclear pol-
icy in nuclear weapon states remains an elite issue.
The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear
Weapons and the Humanitarian Initiative
Moral arguments are traditionally espoused by reli-
gious organizations, and indeed the Catholic Church
has become an important advocate for disarmament
from a moral standpoint. (During the Cold War, it
accepted deterrence in a limited way, but its ethic has
since shifted (Powers 2015).) Today, though, the key
international movement advancing the moral argu-
ment is made up of ICAN and the Humanitarian
Initiative. The Humanitarian Initiative grew out of
frustration among nonnuclear weapon states and civil
society groups with the lack of progress on key ele-
ments of the disarmament agenda under the 1970
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT. The final
documents produced by the NPT Review Conferences
of 1995 and 2000 called for specific multilateral steps,
including ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty,
and the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
in the Middle East. While nonnuclear weapon states
viewed continued bilateral US and Russian nuclear
reductions as a further step in the right direction,
they had become disillusioned with the glacial pace of
progress on multilateral measures. Bilateral arms con-
trol alone does not reduce dependence on nuclear
weapons, or create institutional structures that might
supersede deterrence. With that in mind, the
Humanitarian Initiative has sought to reframe the
debate about nuclear disarmament in terms of the
unacceptable humanitarian impact of nuclear war,
and in doing so delegitimize nuclear weapons as tools
of security (Ritchie 2014; Sauer and Pretorius 2014).
The Humanitarian Initiative models itself on the
success of two previous campaigns: the one that
resulted in the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban, and
the one that resulted in the 2008 Convention on
Cluster Munitions. Despite resistance from countries
that possessed anti-personnel mines and cluster muni-
tions, including the United States and Russia, those
campaigns transformed the perception of these weap-
ons. By broadening the conversation to include evi-
dence of their inhumane effects, organizers were able
to conclude treaties that ban their use, stockpiling,
production, and transfer (Borrie 2014).
The momentum behind the Humanitarian Initiative
began as early as 2007, when a variety of civil society
groups formed ICAN, a coalition of nongovernmental
organizations with representation from one hundred
countries. That momentum got a boost from one of
the major organizations behind the earlier land mine
and cluster munition bans when, in the lead up to the
2010 NPT Review Conference, the President of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
turned his attention to the humanitarian consequences
of nuclear war. He publically said that “the ICRC finds
it difficult to envisage how any use of nuclear weapons
could be compatible with the rules of international
humanitarian law” (Sauer and Pretorius 2014).
The first major conference on the Humanitarian
Initiative took place in spring 2013 in Norway. It
brought together 128 governments, United Nations
organizations, and civil society groups. The conference
provided a forum for an evidence-based discussion of
“the humanitarian and developmental consequences of
a nuclear weapons detonation” (Government of
Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). At that
meeting, and in subsequent ones hosted by Mexico
and Vienna in 2014, experts presented evidence of the
catastrophic global consequences of using nuclear
weapons, including effects on the climate, environ-
ment, and human health “ as well as, potentially, on
the ability of humankind to survive.
The crux of the Humanitarian Initiative’s argument
is that the humanitarian consequences of using nuclear
weapons make them immoral and inhumane, and that
as long as they exist, there is a possibility they will be
used. However, the agenda broadened and evolved over
the course of the conferences to include considerations
of immediate, mid- and long-term human and envir-
onmental costs associated with nuclear tests. The
Vienna conference also included a presentation by
Schlosser on nuclear accidents (Schlosser 2014).
Many participants came to agree on the need for an
international legal instrument that would outlaw the
use of nuclear weapons. In October 2016, with a vote of
123 in favor, 38 against, and 16 abstaining, the United
Nations decided “to convene in 2017 a United Nations
conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to
prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total
elimination” (United Nations General Assembly 2016).
Negotiations on a Ban Treaty – which critics fear could
undermine the NPT – were ongoing at the time of
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publication, with a first draft released on 22 May 2017
(Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons 2017).
The motivating effect of high costs
The authors of this piece have various opinions on
disarmament, but we agree that one set of arguments
stands out for its potential to spark a more informed
debate and greater public engagement on the issue. It
involves current costs.
Arguments based on the real-time costs of develop-
ing and maintaining a nuclear arsenal could lead to
very different policy outcomes than those based on fear
of an apocalyptic future. Cost-based arguments focus
attention on all that is not being prioritized when
governments spend money on their nuclear arsenals:
social care, education, public infrastructure. In other
words, cost arguments ask nuclear weapon states to
examine the trade-offs of their choice. A more sub-
stantive and comprehensive message about the finan-
cial, environmental, human, and political costs
incurred in the pursuit of nuclear weapons could lead
to a discussion of opportunity costs among the public
(Harrington de Santana 2009; Biswas 2014).
Since the end of the Cold War, nongovernmental
organizations, journalists, and academics have begun
collecting information on the costs, financial and
otherwise, of nuclear weapons. Previously, the process
through which nuclear weapon states produced and
maintained their nuclear arsenals took place behind a
wall of secrecy, preempting public debate about costs.
Today, data is most readily available with regard to the
US nuclear program. The price tag for the Manhattan
Project, which developed the first US nuclear weapons
in 1945, came to approximately $26 billion (in 2016
dollars) (Schwartz 1998). The most recent available
data shows that between the early 1940s and the mid-
1990s, the United States spent $5.8 trillion on nuclear
weapons-related activities. And for the period from
2010 to 2018, the United States allocated more than
$179 billion to developing and maintaining its atomic
arsenal (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2013).
Additional costs are difficult to calculate, given that
many of the activities associated with a nuclear military
program are interwoven with the civilian economy.
Despite the resources allocated by the United States
for environmental restoration and waste management,
some have observed that “no amount of money can
return all the land and water under [Department of
Energy] facilities to their original condition” (Schwartz
1998, 374). Global concern about fallout played a role
in driving most nuclear testing underground in the
mid-1960s. Even so, as Joseph Masco observed in his
study of nuclear labs and their surrounding commu-
nities, as a result of nuclear testing, the United States is
already “the most nuclear-bombed country in world,
having detonated nearly one thousand nuclear devices
within its own territorial borders” (Masco 2006, 27).
Communities surrounding former nuclear weapons
production facilities, like the one located at Rocky
Flats in Colorado, are slowly unearthing evidence of
contamination, although establishing reliable causal
links to increased rates of cancer remains controversial
(Iverson 2013).
To be sure, the sum of these costs could not have
been foreseen from the start, and many believed that
they could be offset. For the first nuclear weapon states,
peaceful nuclear energy represented a welcome spin-off
from the atomic weapons effort (Koplow 2011). The
expectation was that nuclear power would allow gov-
ernments to reap positive returns on the huge invest-
ment in nuclear weapons (The Future of Nuclear
Power – Editorial 1948). Creating a nuclear arsenal
entailed a vast infrastructure, covering everything
from mining to uranium enrichment or plutonium
reprocessing. Splitting the atom, according to nuclear
industry advocates, would lead not only to the creation
of tremendously destructive arsenals, but also to energy
which, as one chairman of the US Atomic Energy
Commission put it, would become “too cheap to
meter” (Lewis 1954). In those years, industry discourse
on the feasibility and profitability of nuclear energy
shifted from “if the atom becomes a viable source of
energy” to “when the atom becomes a viable source of
energy” without much consideration for the implica-
tions of such a transition (Washington Report 1955).
Beginning in the 1950s, the industries of the nuclear
weapon states flooded the global market with nuclear
technology.
As it turned out, despite the immense societal ben-
efits of peaceful nuclear technologies, the export of
certain related materials had downstream conse-
quences in terms of nuclear proliferation and the dan-
ger of nuclear terrorism. For example, the United
States and the Soviet Union transferred research reac-
tors powered by highly enriched uranium to numerous
states. After lengthy and elaborate efforts to convert or
shut down these reactors, their material was repatriated
back to the United States and Russia.
In addition to all of these costs, the United States and
other Western donors also spent vast sums of money and
enormous energy to deal with the Soviet nuclear legacy
in Russia and other former Soviet states, including for
threat reduction, environmental remediation, and
defense conversion projects. Today, the United States
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and Russia continue to pay for dismantlement and
destruction of old nuclear weapons and systems, as well
as environmental remediation, even as they spend bil-
lions to undertake nuclear modernization. In light of all
these expenditures, one is left wondering whether dis-
closing the full cost of nuclear weapons could galvanize
public opinion.
Arguments focused on the real-time costs of nuclear
weapons could provide a new basis for civil society
engagement in the disarmament debate. Creating a
sense of urgency about the costs that are being incurred
now, rather than emphasizing the possibility of apoc-
alyptic costs that may or may not be incurred at some
point in the future, may be the best way to engage civil
society on abolishing nuclear weapons.
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